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Abstract
Despite the burgeoning literature on the governance and impact of cross-sector partnerships in the past two decades, the 
debate on how and when these collaborative arrangements address globally relevant problems and contribute to systemic 
change remains open. Building upon the notion of wicked problems and the literature on governing such wicked problems, 
this paper defines harnessing problems in multi-stakeholder partnerships (MSPs) as the approach of taking into account 
the nature of the problem and of organizing governance processes accordingly. The paper develops an innovative analytical 
framework that conceptualizes MSPs in terms of three governance processes (deliberation, decision-making and enforce-
ment) harnessing three key dimensions of wicked problems (knowledge uncertainty, value conflict and dynamic complexity). 
The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil provides an illustrative case study on how this analytical framework describes 
and explains organizational change in partnerships from a problem-based perspective. The framework can be used to better 
understand and predict the complex relationships between MSP governance processes, systemic change and societal prob-
lems, but also as a guiding tool in (re-)organizing governance processes to continuously re-assess the problems over time 
and address them accordingly.
Keywords Wicked problems · Multi-stakeholder partnerships · Cross-sector partnerships · Governance processes · 
Systemic change · Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO)
Introduction
How can multi-stakeholder partnerships (MSPs) contribute 
to addressing globally relevant and complex problems, such 
as global hunger, deforestation and biodiversity loss, cli-
mate change, poverty and violation of human rights? This 
question generates fierce debate among academics, policy 
makers and managers, based on the common observation 
that MSPs, as a specific organizational form that combines 
public and private actors across sectors (Selsky and Parker 
2005), have risen in influence on global governance over the 
last two decades. MSPs are broadly defined as a collabora-
tive form of governance involving mainly business actors 
and civil society organizations that come together to find a 
common approach to a complex problem that affects them 
all (Roloff 2008; Rasche 2012). Examples of MSPs seek-
ing to tackle these problems abound, including the Forest 
Stewardship Council, Marine Stewardship Council, Round-
table on Sustainable Palm Oil, Roundtable on Responsible 
Soy, Alliance for Water Stewardship, or the Sustainability 
Consortium, suggesting that they have become elements in 
innovative solutions for deep-level changes in environmen-
tal, social or economic systems (van Tulder et al. 2016). 
However, despite their attempts of complementing public 
institutions in domains where governments are not able or 
willing to regulate (Scherer and Palazzo 2007), the problems 
that MSPs seek to address remain far from being tamed or, 
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in some cases, have become even more acute (e.g., Levin 
et al. 2012).
An increasingly widespread perspective suggests that 
partnerships can address these complex societal problems by 
triggering or contributing to systemic change (Waddell et al. 
2015; Waddock et al. 2015). Overall, recent studies empha-
size two relevant dimensions of systemic change in relation 
to partnerships (Geels and Schot 2007; Senge et al. 2007; 
Loorbach 2010). First, systemic change involves intercon-
nected change across multiple spheres (e.g., natural, cultural, 
institutional, technological, organizational, individual) and 
subsectors (e.g., change in the food and agricultural subsec-
tor may require and bring about changes in other subsectors 
such as finance, energy, health or education). This has been 
referred to as breadth of change (Waddell et al. 2015). Sec-
ond, systemic change entails a power shift among actors in 
society and a related redistribution of resources in a system. 
This relates to the depth of change (Waddell et al. 2015). 
From this angle, the persisting challenge is whether partner-
ships trigger or support breadth and depth of change to an 
extent that adequately addresses complex societal problems 
(Waddock et al. 2015). This relationship between reaching 
breadth/depth of systemic change and addressing societal 
problems is particularly challenging to understand—let 
alone to empirically measure—since complex systems and 
problems are inherently nonlinear (Waddock et al. 2015).
A recent strand of the literature argues that forms of col-
laborative governance, encompassing processes of interac-
tion, deliberation, decision-making and enforcement (e.g., 
of codes of conduct, standards and best practices), may not 
be suitable to the nature of the problems that they seek to 
address (e.g., Hospes et al. 2012; Waddock 2013)—nor to 
trigger or support systemic change to a sufficient breadth or 
depth (Waddock et al. 2015). Problems like fisheries deple-
tion or tropical deforestation are highly complex, entail 
many interactions and interdependencies, and are charac-
terized by conflicting views amidst considerable knowledge 
uncertainty—all of which pose formidable organizational 
challenges (Ferraro et al. 2015, p. 2). This raises the ques-
tion whether MSPs, as a form of collaborative governance, 
can help tackling complex problems, or at least avoid to 
make them worse (Bitzer and Glasbergen 2015), without a 
deeper understanding of the nature of the problems that they 
seek to address (e.g., George 2014). As Ferraro et al. (2015) 
recently highlighted, understanding how organizations can 
contribute to addressing complex problems requires further 
research on the connections between organizational action 
and field-level changes. From a governance perspective, the 
nature of these problems requires “the pursuit of bold ideas 
and the adoption of less conventional approaches” (Colquitt 
and George 2011, p. 432). An open question is how MSPs 
can pursue and adopt these ideas and approaches.
To contribute to the debate on how partnerships (can) 
address complex problems—and thus trigger or support 
broader and deeper processes of systemic change—this 
paper proposes an analytical framework that assesses 
whether and how MSPs harness the nature of the problems 
around which they are set up. In the context of MSPs, we 
define harnessing a problem as the approach of (1) taking 
into account its nature and (2) organizing the partnership 
governance processes accordingly. First of all, to consider 
the nature of problems, we apply the original definition of 
wicked problems (Rittel and Webber 1973) in the context 
of MSPs since the aforementioned societal problems are 
wicked in nature (Batie 2008; Dentoni et al. 2012). Wicked 
problems are realms of ill-defined issues that, relative to 
“tame” problems (Conklin 2006), cannot be framed and 
understood in linear cause–symptom–effect relationships 
(knowledge uncertainty), evolve unpredictably over time 
(dynamic complexity) and involve conflicts of values among 
stakeholders (value conflict). As such, wicked problems 
require fundamentally different approaches than tame prob-
lems—governance approaches which can instigate deeper 
and broader systemic change (Ferraro et al. 2015).
To assess whether and how MSPs harness the problems 
that they are addressing, we investigate the different gov-
ernance processes, including formal and informal elements 
(Rufin and Rivera-Santos 2012) that support MSPs and their 
participants to take into account and respond to the nature of 
the problems at hand. Harnessing wicked problems would 
imply having governance processes in MSPs which con-
tinuously re-assess and re-address problems over time and 
seek an acceptable temporary synthesis between conflict-
ing stakeholders’ views and values (Termeer et al. 2015). 
Specifically, to understand whether and how MSPs harness 
wicked problems, we focus on three interrelated governance 
processes that are critical for keeping awareness and acting 
on the problems at hand: deliberation, decision-making and 
enforcement (Schouten and Glasbergen 2012). This study is 
meant to deepen analytical knowledge on what harnessing 
is and how it takes place in the context of MSPs through a 
framework which guides empirical operationalization. While 
the paper does not aim to normatively prescribe how MSPs 
should harness problems and how they would be most effec-
tive at this, we do distill a number of practical recommen-
dations for MSP practitioners based on both the framework 
and the findings from the illustrative case study introduced 
below.
The proposed analytical framework is applied to the case 
of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), which 
serves as an empirical illustration of whether and how an 
MSP harnesses wicked problems. With more than 10 years 
of history, governance issues in the RSPO have been widely 
studied in academia and critically assessed by external stake-
holders over time. Throughout these years, the RSPO has 
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been dealing with several entangled issues afflicting palm 
oil production systems, local natural and socioeconomic 
systems as well as the global ecosystem (see Harnessing 
Wicked Problems in the RSPO: historical background and 
Harnessing Wicked Problems in the RSPO: an empirical 
illustration Sections). As such, the RSPO illustrates the 
interrelatedness among governance processes in MSPs, the 
problems to address and the processes of systemic change 
that partnerships wish to trigger or support (Waddock et al. 
2015).
Methods
This paper seeks to make a conceptual contribution, as it 
advances an analytical framework to describe and under-
stand whether and how MSPs harness wicked societal prob-
lems from a governance perspective. The framework builds 
upon two underpinnings: the notion of wicked problems and 
theories of governance that focus on the nature of problems 
at hand. Accordingly, the following three steps of literature 
review support the development of the analytical framework:
• A review of the notion of wicked problems, its relation-
ship with systemic change and our proposed operation-
alization in the context of MSPs (The Nature of Wicked 
Problems Section);
• A discussion of the literature on the governance of 
wicked problems, first in the public policy domain and 
then in the context of MSPs as forms of private govern-
ance (Governing Wicked Problems Through MSPs Sec-
tion);
• An in-depth view into three key governance processes 
of MSPs, namely deliberation, decision-making and 
enforcement (Understanding the Governance Processes 
of MSPs Section).
These steps of conceptual development support the 
proposed framework, which involves the definition and 
operationalization of whether and how MSPs harness 
wicked problems (Harnessing Wicked Problems in MSPs: 
An analytical framework Section). This operationaliza-
tion takes place through a 3 × 3 matrix (Table 2) since the 
three interrelated MSP governance processes (deliberation, 
decision-making and enforcement) are analyzed along the 
three identified dimensions of wicked problems (knowledge 
uncertainty, value conflict and dynamic complexity). Within 
this 3 × 3 matrix, each of the nine generated cells advances a 
set of questions and related qualitative indicators reflecting 
whether and how MSPs harness the three key dimensions 
of wicked problems in the three governance processes. We 
derive these key indicators from a synthesis of the reviewed 
literature and our definition of harnessing problems.
As mentioned, we use the Roundtable on Sustainable 
Palm Oil (RSPO) as an empirical illustration to showcase 
how the analytical framework can guide the operationali-
zation of whether and how MSPs harness wicked prob-
lems (Harnessing Wicked Problems in the RSPO: his-
torical background and Harnessing Wicked Problems in 
the RSPO: an empirical illustration Sections). The RSPO 
provides a fertile empirical ground to assess and itera-
tively enrich our proposed analytical framework, as it is 
one of the most established MSPs (founded in 2004) and 
has attracted significant attention by scholars over recent 
years. As a result, there is a richness of academic stud-
ies (i.e., peer reviewed publications) as well as secondary 
sources (e.g., reports, websites, blogs, newsletters, etc.) on 
the RSPO, which offer sufficient insights for the purpose 
of this paper without requiring new empirical research. 
Taking the RSPO as an illustrative case study serves two 
purposes: firstly, to clarify the analytical argument devel-
oped in this paper by giving a concrete example of its 
application, and secondly, to demonstrate the empirical 
relevance of the approach developed in the paper (Eck-
stein 1975). Since the framework has an analytical nature 
rather than a prescriptive one, it is beyond the scope of 
this empirical illustration to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the RSPO in harnessing the wicked problems or to insti-
gate sufficient depth or breadth systemic change during its 
history. The inherently nonlinear nature of wicked prob-
lems and of the systems in which these are situated (Wad-
dock et al. 2015) would make it empirically impossible 
to demonstrate causal relationships between governance 
approaches in the RSPO, the nature of systemic change 
and problem mitigation. Instead, the RSPO case shows that 
analyzing how MSPs harness wicked problems in govern-
ance processes helps explaining the MSPs’ organizational 
evolution over time (Discussion and conclusion Section).
To provide a rich illustration of the RSPO case, we first 
reviewed the literature on the RSPO since its origins in 
2004, for a total of 45 journal articles. Second, with a 
first draft of the 3 × 3 matrix of our analytical framework 
at hand, we coded information from 36 of these articles 
according to how the RSPO has harnessed the wicked 
problem at stake during the three identified governance 
processes (while the remaining 9 out of 45 articles did 
not provide relevant information, e.g., they focused only 
on technical aspects of palm oil production and related 
standards rather than on governance processes). Third, we 
used the codes from the 36 articles to assess whether they 
reflected the three governance processes and three wicked 
problem dimensions of the 3 × 3 matrix. By comparing 
the analytical framework against these empirical codes, 
we found that the 3 × 3 matrix was a helpful tool to under-
stand how an MSP harnesses the key dimensions of wicked 
problems. Finally, we developed tables (Tables 3, 4, 5) 
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that empirically illustrates our analytical framework based 
on a synthesis of the empirical codes from the journal 
articles and secondary sources from multiple stakeholders 
(Harnessing Wicked Problems in the RSPO: an empirical 
illustration Section).
Literature Review
The Nature of Wicked Problems
To understand how MSPs deal with the nature of problems, 
we first revisited the concept of wicked problems. Rittel and 
Webber (1973) coined the term “wicked” to describe highly 
intractable problems facing the planning of the growing city 
of San Francisco in the early 1970s. Wicked problems differ 
from “tame” problems because they are characterized by 
ambiguous and uncertain settings and elicit strongly conflict-
ing views held by stakeholders when it comes to identifying 
the cause of and solution to a problem. As a result, wicked 
problems are difficult, if not impossible, to define and solve. 
While the literature on policy and public administration has 
widely adopted the definition introduced by Rittel and Web-
ber in ten points, studies have focused in particular on the 
intractable and dynamic nature of wicked problems (Batie 
2008), the social construction of problem definitions and 
perceptions (Roberts 2000; Weber and Khademian 2008), 
and the futility of attempts to solve wicked problems (Conk-
lin 2006; Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009). Recent theorizing 
on wicked problems has also identified additional features of 
“super wicked” problems, such as climate change, including: 
“time is running out,” “those seeking to end the problem 
are also causing it,” there is “no central authority” able to 
address the problem, and policies are limited to present-
day considerations and “discount the future irrationally” 
(Lazarus 2008; Levin et al. 2012).
In relation to its original definition (Rittel and Webber 
1973), we seek to operationalize the concept in a way that is 
more relevant and easier to use in the context of the govern-
ance processes of MSPs. In particular, we propose three key 
features (or dimensions) that distinguish wicked problems: 
(1) knowledge uncertainty, (2) value conflict among multi-
ple stakeholders and (3) dynamic complexity, in that they 
have no unique and final solution(s) or outcome(s) (Kreuter 
et al. 2004; Batie 2008). In Table 1 we present the ten char-
acteristics of wicked problems as described by Rittel and 
Webber (1973) and the three dimensions identified accord-
ingly. Knowledge uncertainty refers to both the formulation 
of the problem(s) and the potential solutions such that stake-
holders have to make decisions in an incomplete informa-
tion setting. Uncertainty derives from limited availability 
of information due to gaps in scientific knowledge of the 
problem(s) and solution(s) and is aggravated by cognitive 
limits of decision-makers to adequately deal with, process 
and put into use the information that is available (Dietz et al. 
2003; Hajer 2003; Batie 2008; Head and Alford 2013). The 
presence of value conflict represents another dimension of 
wicked problems. Multiple stakeholders are affected by 
wicked problems, each with their own set of values, frames, 
perceptions and interests, which may not only diverge but 
downright oppose and clash with one another. The wicked-
ness of problems is such that there may not even be a general 
consensus on broad societal goals and much less a consensus 
on what type of information and knowledge would be rel-
evant to address a particular wicked problem (Batie 2008). 
Hence, trade-offs between values are likely to occur (Weber 
and Khademian 2008). Finally, as wicked problems involve 
complex interdependencies, they are volatile and evolve 
over time, sometimes linearly but frequently unpredictably 
and unexpectedly (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009). This 
dynamic complexity implies that there are no “solutions” in 
the sense of definite and objective answers to the problem 
over time (Rittel and Webber 1973). This characterization 
of wicked problems suggests that addressing them requires 
deep and broad changes in the complex systems which they 
are situated (Ferraro et al. 2015; Waddock et al. 2015).
Governing Wicked Problems Through MSPs
The key implication of these dimensions of wicked prob-
lems is that no stakeholder can effectively respond to 
wicked problems independently from other stakeholders—
individual action against wicked problems has limited or 
no effectiveness if uncoordinated from the action of others 
(Conklin 2006). Traditional approaches based on public gov-
ernance are deemed unsuitable in this context (Colquitt and 
George 2011). Alternative approaches are needed, including 
alternative ways of observing the wickedness of problems 
and enabling the conditions of the governance system in 
which actors operate to deal with the problems (Termeer 
et al. 2015). Scholars have therefore emphasized the impor-
tance of developing a network and systems perspective 
for approaching wicked problems (Weber and Khadem-
ian 2008). Others have paid attention to the value conflicts 
between stakeholders and have proposed collaborative and 
deliberative forms of governance as a strategy for inclusion, 
reflection and responsiveness to multiple perspectives (e.g., 
Sachs et al. 2010). Termeer et al. (2015) reiterated the need 
for a dynamic perspective on wicked problems to ensure 
continuous assessments of the problem over time. They 
argued for “reflexivity” in problem frames, “resilience” and 
“responsiveness” to adapt flexibly to changing circumstances 
or changing public demands, and “revitalization” to break 
with established patterns of behavior in deadlock situations. 
Even then, reaching acceptable and stable outcomes is far 
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from being guaranteed given the messiness of the problems 
(Ney and Verweij 2014).
“Harnessing wickedness,” i.e., the approach of taking 
into account and responding to the different dimensions of 
wicked problems, thus requires a governance process that 
enables networked action, stimulate collective processes and 
deal with complex dynamics to achieve small wins (Termeer 
et al. 2015). Previous studies have indicated the potential 
of MSPs as collaborative arrangements in which different 
actors, e.g., from business, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and, in some cases governments and academia, join 
forces to find a collective approach to a problem that affects 
them all (e.g., Roloff 2008; Dentoni et al. 2012). MSPs are 
often conceptualized as forms of private governance (e.g., 
Gulbrandsen 2004; Pattberg 2006; Mena and Palazzo 2012). 
This concept refers to “a form of socio-political steering in 
which private actors are directly involved in regulating—in 
the form of standards or more general normative guidance—
the behavior of a distinct group of stakeholders” (Pattberg 
2006, p. 591). As such, MSPs may be able to exploit the 
interdependencies between actors necessary to address 
wicked problems for three main reasons (Dentoni and Bitzer 
2015). First, knowledge uncertainty, including unknown, 
unclear or hidden cause–effect relationships underlying the 
problem at hand, is dealt with by involving actors who cut 
across different knowledge domains. Second, value conflicts 
between stakeholders and struggles over the nature of the 
problem can be brought to the table and discussed through 
deliberation and negotiation to find a temporarily accept-
able synthesis. These interaction processes are one of the 
major sources of sense making and problem (re-)framing 
(Rivera-Santos and Rufin 2011). Finally, dynamic com-
plexity, expressing that wicked problems mutate over time, 
demands a continuous process of knowledge production 
to adapt to changing problem contexts (Crona and Parker 
2012). As they often operate through networked structures 
and flexibility in decision-making and action, MSPs could 
constitute promising and “less conventional approaches” 
(Colquitt and George 2011, p. 432) to deal with the nature 
of wicked problems.
Understanding the Governance Processes of MSPs
Despite growing elaborations on wicked problems and 
increased recognition of the type of governance needed to 
address these issues, Ison et al. (2015) noted that there is 
limited evidence that understandings about “wicked prob-
lems” have been incorporated into governance processes, 
such as those by MSPs. This refers to the question of 
whether or not, and to what extent, understandings about the 
wickedness of problems are incorporated into the structures 
and enacted through practices that determine how partners 
in an MSP interact with each other, and how they make, 
implement and monitor agreements.
MSPs emerge when a particular problem becomes urgent 
for specific stakeholders who believe that they need to do 
something about it, but could not approach it on their own 
(Roloff 2008). Collaboration typically starts among a small 
number of organizations, usually involving NGOs and a 
group of businesses who self-select to be pioneer members, 
either to gain reputational benefits vis-à-vis competitors or 
to establish a level playing field (Zeyen et al. 2016). While 
little is known on why certain groups of stakeholders are 
involved in the formation of an MSP and others are not 
(Fransen and Kolk 2007), self-selection tends to be based 
on the belief that together these actors are the “right ones” 
to address the problem at hand (Schouten and Glasbergen 
2011). Afterward, this pioneering group will negotiate the 
terms of engagement and the conditions that determine 
further MSP membership (Zeyen et al. 2016). On the one 
hand, MSPs are keen to claim legitimacy based on the par-
ticipation of “all categories of stakeholders” (Cheyns and 
Riisgaard 2014). On the other hand, defining membership 
becomes political when the founding members prefer cer-
tain stakeholders over others, since this is an opportunity to 
shape the range of voices and interests represented within 
MSPs (Fransen and Kolk 2007). Formal barriers to joining 
MSPs may be low, but de facto membership opportunities 
are often tied to the availability of resources and capabili-
ties, including the ability to conform to already established 
formats of participation, which may limit the inclusiveness 
of MSPs (Cheyns 2014). Other organizations purposefully 
choose not to join and participate as outsiders in different 
ways, e.g., by monitoring and campaigning (Pesqueira and 
Glasbergen 2013).
After its initial formation, governance by MSPs mani-
fests in a set of three processes that continuously evolve 
and interplay over the life of the partnership (Gray 1989; 
Schouten and Glasbergen 2012). The first governance pro-
cess describes the interaction, negotiation and discussion—
here captured as deliberation—between the actors involved. 
Since MSP members come from different sectoral, cultural 
and ideological backgrounds, divergent and possibly con-
flicting objectives and motivations are likely to be present. 
In this sense, MSPs are recognized as sites of negotiation 
about norms and interpretations rather than mere forums 
for the planning and implementation of pre-identified pol-
icy objectives (Forsyth 2010). Processes of deliberation are 
often conceptualized against the normative ideals of delib-
erative democracy, describing processes dominated by open 
and fair exchange of arguments to understand each other’s 
perspectives, in which power relations between participants 
are neutralized (Dryzek and Stevenson 2011). Deliberative 
processes are also thought helpful to grasp the complex-
ity of the issue and connect individual interests to broader 
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societal interests, paving the way for reaching mutual 
agreement (Baur and Arenas 2014). In recognition of pre-
existing inequalities and power imbalances between actors, 
which could distort the deliberative processes, formalized 
endeavors to ensure representative inclusion of different 
stakeholder categories can be observed in some MSPs (e.g., 
Fortin 2013; Klooster 2010; Mena and Palazzo 2012). Other 
MSPs have established working groups for fact finding as a 
way to address power asymmetries and contentious issues 
(Schouten and Glasbergen 2011). Nonetheless, many studies 
reveal that even such affirmative formal arrangements are 
unlikely to compensate for the dominance of particular par-
ticipants, power plays and coalitions within MSPs (Schouten 
et al. 2012; Fortin 2013; Cheyns and Riisgaard 2014).
The second governance process of MSPs concerns deci-
sion-making. Ideally, the process of deliberation leads to a 
shared problem definition, which enables the identification 
and selection of different approaches for implementation. As 
MSPs are expected to build their decision-making processes 
in a way that power differences between the various actors 
involved are offset, many MSPs have adopted a “chamber” 
governance structure, in which stakeholders are grouped 
in different categories and each has one vote (Mena and 
Palazzo 2012). Others have a governing board where differ-
ent groups of stakeholders are represented equally to achieve 
voting balance, or even regular rotation of positions among 
stakeholder groups in decision-making bodies (Fransen and 
Kolk 2007). However, this refers only to formal decision-
making procedures and structures, whereas negotiation and 
bargaining is likely to occur a priori through informal prac-
tices. This is not only due to differences in problem framing, 
but crucially because the decision about which approach to 
select is closely connected to the question of who will con-
tribute what in the implementation process (Roloff 2008). 
Different studies have shed light on the negotiation prac-
tices preceding formal decision-making, in which already 
pre-existing relations and power imbalances between actors 
seem to be re-inscribed rather than neutralized (Schouten 
et al. 2012; Fortin 2013). Such perspectives have highlighted 
in particular the weak representation of powerless and “vul-
nerable” groups, such as small-scale producers, in these 
processes (Cheyns and Riisgaard 2014). The result is that 
MSPs’ approach for implementation is often not the “sci-
entifically best, environmentally strongest, or socially the 
most ideal,” but one that achieved some level of agreement 
and is likely to be easy to implement (Klooster 2010). Roloff 
(2008) argued that compromise and appeasement orientation 
is necessary to keep organizations involved despite mutual 
wide-ranging differences and avoid the exodus of those 
organizations that feel disadvantaged by decision-making.
The third process concerns the enforcement of deci-
sions and agreements, i.e., implementation and monitoring, 
which are critical for MSPs’ claims on effectiveness. Many 
MSPs work through sustainability standards as a form of 
voluntary private regulation, where standard compliance is 
verified through regular third-party monitoring to achieve 
objective, independent measurements (O’Rourke 2006; 
Hatanaka and Busch 2008). MSP members are expected to 
be the first adopters of the jointly developed standards, but 
MSPs also aim to generate widespread standard diffusion 
beyond direct members. This requires creating incentives 
for standard adopters, including material benefits, such as 
price premiums and selective supply chains, and social legit-
imation (Wijen 2014). However, third-party monitoring of 
standards is expensive, involving costs of certification and 
costs of compliance. This has been shown to create monitor-
ing fatigue and raises the risk of symbolic adoption to reap 
the standards’ benefits without bearing the associated costs 
(Mena and Palazzo 2012; Wijen 2014). Moreover, studies 
have revealed how standards and certification, instead of 
being neutral tools to implement MSPs’ decisions, have 
also given rise to political contestation between the actors 
involved on issues of equity, effectiveness and inclusive-
ness (Schouten and Glasbergen 2011; Bitzer and Glasbergen 
2015). Thus, enforcement is not simply a transmission of 
policies and practices from the global to the local level, but 
is entangled in the continuous negotiation over rights and 
responsibilities and struggles over the nature of the problem 
and its appropriate solutions (Andonova et al. 2009).
Such contestation can lead MSPs to re-open discussions 
about problem definition and approaches, thus starting again 
with amending the deliberation process in the course of time. 
Iterations can also occur as the group of actors in MSPs 
is likely to change over time, since some actors may leave 
the partnerships and others join, which adds new views on 
the issue at stake. Thus, MSPs tend to interplay between 
deliberation, decision-making and enforcement processes in 
their life cycle, during which membership composition also 
changes (Roloff 2008).
Harnessing Wicked Problems in MSPs: 
An Analytical Framework
Thus far, our review of the literature has pursued the fol-
lowing line of argumentation: (1) wicked problems can 
be distinguished according to three key dimensions; (2) 
scholars have recently advocated for collaborative forms of 
governance, such as MSPs, to address the wicked nature of 
problems; and (3) governance in MSPs is characterized by 
three main processes that interplay over time after a forma-
tion phase. These three governance processes are character-
ized by continuous negotiation between the actors involved, 
where voice and power remain key ingredients (Bäck-
strand 2006). Yet, studies also reveal the fluidity of MSP 
governance as a continuous process of re-understanding, 
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re-assessing, adjustment and adaptation (e.g., Klooster 2010; 
Schouten et al. 2012). This also suggests to take an analytical 
view on partnerships, which leads to a more specific defini-
tion of harnessing wicked problems in MSPs. In particular, 
this is defined as the approach of understanding and acting 
upon the dimensions of the addressed problems (knowledge 
uncertainty, value conflict and dynamic complexity) during 
the different governance processes of MSPs (deliberation, 
decision-making and enforcement).
In line with the iterative character of the different govern-
ance processes in MSPs, we understand harnessing wicked 
problems in MSP governance as inherently iterative. Taken 
together, the three interrelated processes of deliberation, 
decision-making and enforcement reflect an interconnected, 
nonlinear process over time in which the key dimensions of 
wicked problems can potentially be harnessed:
1. Harnessing knowledge uncertainty collectively gather-
ing, interpreting and using data on the causes, symptoms 
and consequences of the problem that the partnership 
aims to tackle.
2. Harnessing value conflict collectively gathering, inter-
preting and synthesizing the variety of values repre-
sented by the stakeholders influencing or affected by the 
problem at hand, in particular those that are not perma-
nent MSP members.
3. Harnessing dynamic complexity collectively gathering 
knowledge from stakeholders and making sense of how 
the problem is evolving over time.
To guide the analysis of whether and how MSPs harness 
wicked problems, Table 2 presents a 3 × 3 matrix showing 
the three key dimensions of wicked problems combined with 
three main governance processes of MSPs. Based on the 
literature review presented in Literature Review Section, 
the table contains two main elements to operationalize the 
concept of harnessing wicked problems in MSP governance. 
First, the matrix presents one key research question for each 
of the nine quadrants of the matrix to facilitate an in-depth 
inquiry which connects governance by MSPs with the nature 
of wicked problems. Second, the matrix identifies qualitative 
indicators that empirically reflect the approach of harnessing 
wicked problems, i.e., organizing governance processes in 
MSPs according to the nature of wicked problems. These 
indicators do not represent prescriptive recommendations, 
but should be understood as a proposed operationalization 
of what harnessing wicked problems is. First, the qualitative 
indicators involve the participation of stakeholders from a 
diversity of backgrounds, knowledge perspectives and con-
flicting values in line with the notion that organizations 
adapting to the nature of problems are multi-vocal (Dentoni 
and Ross 2013; Ferraro et al. 2015; Ison et al. 2015). Thus, 
the focus of harnessing problems goes beyond stakeholder 
selection—which implies granting access but not necessarily 
providing the conditions for stakeholders to participate and 
continuously reframe the problems. Furthermore, harness-
ing plays out through a combination of formal and informal 
elements, understanding that both enact the identified gov-
ernance processes in MSPs. For instance, formal elements, 
such as the allocation of resources to motivate the participa-
tion of resource-poor stakeholders, are met with informal 
elements such as practices of knowledge sharing, debating, 
arguing and acting. This combination of formal and informal 
elements may not only determine which stakeholders par-
ticipate and to what extent, but more generally how MSPs 
harness wicked problems (e.g., how MSPs make sense of 
constantly changing problems or how they jointly reflect on 
new knowledge and information) (Waddell et al. 2013; Ham-
ilton 2013; Cheyns and Riisgaard 2014).
Harnessing Wicked Problems in the RSPO: 
Historical Background
The global palm oil controversy has been characterized by 
conflicting frames about palm oil production, whereby some 
hail palm oil as a wonder crop—as it generates the high-
est production of vegetable oil per hectare of land and is 
of major importance for economies in Southern producing 
countries—while others, such as international NGOs, frame 
palm oil production as an important cause of deforestation, 
loss of biodiversity, forest fires, air pollution, greenhouse 
gas emissions, land conflicts and/or social-political tensions 
within communities (Hospes et al. 2017).1 The proposed 
analytical framework, in connection with the suggested key 
research questions and indicators, allows interpreting the 
case of RSPO in light of whether and how it has been har-
nessing the wicked problem in its history.
Phase 1 (2002–2005): Partnership Establishment 
and the Denial of the Wicked Problem
In the early 2000s, the rapidly increasing global demand 
for palm oil and the resultant expansion of areas planted 
to oil palm, especially in Southeast Asia, led to large-scale 
public outcry and debate on the sustainability of palm oil 
production, especially in Europe. Media and environmental 
NGO campaigns started fierce attacks against the palm oil 
industry, including large multinational consumer compa-
nies. In response to the heightened public pressure, in 2002 
WWF (World Wildlife Fund) and Unilever started discuss-
ing the establishment of a Roundtable, based on the shared 
1 For an overview of sustainability issues associated with palm oil 
production see “Appendix”.
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perception that palm oil production was associated with 
deforestation. WWF and Unilever decided to invite other 
stakeholders to join the discussions in an attempt to find 
answers that would satisfy all stakeholders in the commod-
ity chain as well as environmental conservationists (Omont 
2004). In 2004, the RSPO was formally established under 
Swiss law with an initial membership of 47 organizations 
from business and civil society.
However, the problem of palm oil production turned 
out not to be as straightforward as the organizations first 
assumed. The UK-based environmental consultancy firm 
ProForest was hired to conduct technical studies to develop 
further insights into the issue. These studies formed the basis 
for the initial discussions between stakeholders. Although 
there was still no consensus about the exact link between 
palm oil and deforestation, using the technical studies by 
ProForest helped to narrow down and clearly demarcate the 
problem at an early stage (Nikoloyuk et al. 2010). As only 
relatively few organizations were involved in the early days 
of the RSPO, Unilever and WWF were able to hold key posi-
tions during the multi-stakeholder processes and steer the 
discussions based on pragmatism and technical rationality 
(Ponte and Cheyns 2013). This ensured that value conflicts 
between stakeholders were reduced to a minimum and par-
tially pushed outside the RSPO boundaries (Schouten and 
Glasbergen 2012).
Priority in the newly founded RSPO was given to estab-
lishing credible sustainability criteria that were accept-
able to all stakeholders (Omont 2004). For this purpose, in 
2004 the Criteria Working Group (CWG) was formed with 
the objective of presenting Principles and Criteria (P&C) 
for sustainable palm oil by 2005. The CWG was based on 
decision-making through consensus; no decision could be 
taken against the will of one of the main groups. The draft 
P&C were prepared by ProForest, based on their own studies 
and existing guidelines by companies. NGOs fed this pro-
cess by supplying additional data on environmental issues 
and effective communication strategies, including in-depth 
field research, photographic and interview evidence of 
unsustainable practices, and direct lobbying of firms and 
governments, especially European governments, and RSPO 
member firms such as Unilever (Nesadurai 2013). However, 
the CWG process was criticized internally for insufficient 
representativeness—no smallholders were included and few 
representatives from Africa—and for not giving a clear and 
active role to researchers (Omont 2004). Soon after the first 
presentation of the draft P&C in 2005, a smallholder task-
force was established which decided to create a system of 
group certification for smallholders, so that individual small-
holders could share the costs of certification and be certified 
under a single certificate. The RSPO thus reacted swiftly to 
the emerging criticism that its main future instrument (the 
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P&C) would be applicable to large-scale plantations only, 
thereby implicitly excluding smallholder farmers.
Assessing this first phase in terms of systemic change, 
it becomes clear that the RSPO was limited in reaching 
breadth as well as depth of change. Although the RSPO 
was able to make connections between different spheres to 
a limited extent—by creating a deliberation space in which 
multiple stakeholder could interact—the RSPO did not 
trigger substantial changes in other subsectors. Moreover, 
although RSPO members were able to create a new delibera-
tion space, this did not lead to a significant shift in power in 
the relationships among stakeholders in this phase.
Phase 2 (2006–2009): First Glimpses 
into the Wickedness of Palm Oil Production
The first generic P&C were approved in 2007, and the cer-
tification mechanism was adopted in 2008. However, the 
ratification of the P&C was preceded by a process of contes-
tation. While at first, the problem definition was rather nar-
row, new problems related to palm oil continued to surface 
on the agenda. From various internal and external sources, 
criticism arose which targeted the content of the P&C and 
brought to light the complexity of palm oil. For instance, 
Oxfam, as a new member to the RSPO, published a report 
in 2006 to raise awareness of the relationship between palm 
oil and poverty, while previously the focus of the discussions 
in the RSPO was almost exclusively on the environmental 
dimension of palm oil production, and in particular its link 
with deforestation (Pesqueira and Glasbergen 2013). Oxfam 
even invited smallholder farmers to speak at an RSPO meet-
ing, exposing human rights violations of companies. This 
triggered value conflicts with stakeholders from Malaysia 
and Indonesia who denied these allegations and insisted that 
palm oil did not contribute to poverty, but rather that palm 
oil production had brought significant economic growth to 
both countries, resulting in substantial poverty reduction. 
This conflict continued over the years, with both sides sup-
plying more “evidence” in the form of reports supporting 
their perspective.
The discussions on this became so prominent that the 
RSPO saw itself forced to adjust both its P&C and its gov-
ernance structure. Firstly, as a result of Oxfam’s advocacy, 
social criteria were better specified and linked to interna-
tional practices, and the international norm of Free, Prior, 
and Informed Consent (FPIC) was integrated in the P&C in 
2007. FPIC is a key principle in international law with regard 
to ensuring the rights of indigenous people, and demands 
of investors or companies to engage with indigenous peo-
ples and local communities prior to the establishment of 
new palm oil plantations and other agricultural develop-
ment on customary land (Pesqueira and Glasbergen 2013). 
Such engagement is supposed to be based on non-coercive 
negotiations, participatory assessments, and benefit-sharing 
agreements in which local communities can grant or with-
hold consent to activities that affect their cultures and rights 
(op cit.). Second, in 2008, the RSPO also created a Dispute 
Settlement Facility, to be used as a mediation facility to 
help resolve disputes between local communities and palm 
oil producers in cases where at least one party is an RSPO 
member. An Advisory Group was established to help set up 
the Dispute Settlement Facility and to monitor any arising 
cases and give recommendations to the RSPO.
In 2009, Oxfam Novib demanded an official investigation 
of the National Interpretation process in Colombia which 
had been led by the palm oil industry from 2008 to 2009. 
The process was characterized by strong power asymmetries 
among stakeholders and clashes between their different val-
ues, giving rise to strong contestation of RSPO legitimacy 
by local actors who resisted the expansion of oil palm cul-
tivation (Marin-Burgos et al. 2015). The official evaluation 
concluded that the National Interpretation process neither 
included representatives of Afro-Colombia, indigenous peo-
ple and peasant organizations nor utilized an appropriate 
methodology for effective stakeholder participation (Marin-
Burgos et al. 2015). Also the environmental dimension of 
palm oil production turned into a more complex issue than 
what was reflected during the early phase of the RSPO. 
In 2007, Greenpeace as an external actor (non-member) 
published a report (“Cooking the Climate”) linking CO2 
emissions from cleared peat lands in Indonesia to activities 
of RSPO members. The entry of this report into the arena 
of palm oil politics destabilized the attempt to strengthen 
institutional legitimacy through the launch of certification 
(Orsato et al. 2013).
During the same year, the annual Roundtable conference 
was characterized by substantial debate. Following the adop-
tion of the European Union’s Renewable Energy Directive 
in 2009, NGOs and downstream firms, such as consumer 
manufacturers or retailers, proposed including similar green-
house gas (GHG) emission criteria in the RSPO, whereas 
another group of RSPO members threatened to walk out of 
the General Assembly due to these newly proposed criteria 
(Adnan 2009). At the same time, the number of voices that 
had an influence within the RSPO was still limited. Farmers 
and local communities found it difficult to be heard because 
they used the forum to complain and accuse plantation com-
panies, and because they relied on specific cases with very 
long histories (Cheyns 2014). A Dutch industry representa-
tive explained that by raising land right issues during the 
plenary debate, and how they did so, local communities 
caused a “negative energy” and proposed converting their 
participation to indirect representation via an NGO on the 
Executive Board (Cheyns 2014).
Assessing this second phase in terms of systemic change, 
the influence of the RSPO on the breadth and depth of 
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systemic change become more evident yet still limited. By 
creating a certification system, the RSPO was able to estab-
lish connection between multiple spheres: an institution 
providing certification as a “signal” on sustainability, new 
technology to verify and support certification, organizations 
such as manufacturers and farmers valuing this certification 
and, last but not the least, consumer awareness on palm oil 
and its certification raised. Moreover, the Roundtable was 
able to establish connection, most notably between agri-
cultural production, deforestation and the issue of poverty, 
thus involving multiple economic subsectors other than pal 
oil itself. Furthermore, NGOs, mostly Southern ones, were 
empowered by being part of the MSP and having access to 
diverse contacts, knowledge resources and working groups. 
Nevertheless, significant power shifts within the palm oil 
value chain still did not occur in this phase.
Phase 3 (2010–2013): Increased Encounter 
of Wickedness and Increased Value Conflict
While in the previous period the wickedness of the problem 
already became apparent, the dynamic complexity of palm 
oil production was increasingly embraced by the RSPO from 
2010 onwards. A growing number of issues linked to palm 
oil production arose and were discussed in the RSPO, both 
raised by RSPO members and by external organizations, 
especially NGOs.
The issue of GHG emissions resulting from growing palm 
oil on peat lands became one of the focal points of discus-
sion. The RSPO reacted with the establishment of a variety 
of working groups. Two science-based working groups on 
GHG were active in RSPO from 2009 to 2011 to identify 
ways to achieve reductions of GHG emissions. One of the 
outputs was the development of PalmGHG, a GHG calcula-
tor using life cycle assessment to quantify major sources of 
emissions and sequestration for individual palm oil mills and 
their supply base (Bessou et al. 2014). Debates took place 
mostly during the annual Roundtable meetings and General 
Assemblies whereby a clear preference for data from NGOs 
and companies becomes evident. Although the knowledge 
input is fairly diverse, the use of these different inputs is 
rather restricted; input from academia, farmers’ associations 
and communities is not considered when knowledge is pro-
cessed (Offermans and Glasbergen 2015). Knowledge supply 
is diverse when looking at the domains that are involved 
in producing knowledge, but also relatively homogeneous 
because of the input is dominated by NGOs (Offermans and 
Glasbergen 2015).
After 5 years of implementation, in 2012–2013, the P&C 
were reviewed by the RSPO P&C Review Taskforce and 
Steering Group in accordance with the RSPO P&C Review 
Process. During the revision process of RSPO’s P&Cs, the 
conflict about GHG surfaced again. Value clashes prevented 
clear, stringent rules on GHG emissions or a moratorium 
on use of peat lands, leading to a situation of impasse. Arti-
cles in the Malaysian newspaper “The Star” highlighted 
Malaysian oil palm growers’ objection to the fact that the 
revised RSPO P&C seek to minimize GHG emissions from 
new plantings (Wong 2013). In a response, the RSPO urged 
their members to vote in favor of the revised P&C during an 
extraordinary general assembly (RSPO 2013) and in April 
2013 the revised P&C were indeed approved. In the revised 
P&C “growers and millers have committed to an imple-
mentation period that begins with initially reporting to the 
RSPO, and after December 31, 2016, the commitment will 
transmit to public reporting.” Even though this is a rather 
weak reporting criterion, it is still highly contentious. One 
of the arguments put forward by the opponents of GHG cri-
teria to be included in the standard is that GHG emissions 
are mostly relevant in the context of biofuel usage but not in 
palm oil production.
Another source of contestation was the Dispute Settle-
ment Facility which was introduced during the previous 
period. Mechanisms that were put in place, such as this 
Facility and third-party auditing, do not fully work in prac-
tice (i.e., in terms of monitoring and enforcement) and in 
turn led to new, exacerbated value conflicts. By disqualifying 
forms of proof that are drawn from a familiar engagement, 
the RSPO and its certification system reinforces existing 
power relations between local communities and companies, 
because the latter are able to provide formal proofs, while 
the former are not (Silva-Casteñada 2012). Local commu-
nities and NGOs have therefore challenged the majority of 
RSPO certificates, because they fail to recognize the exist-
ence of conflicts between certified companies and local com-
munities (Silva-Casteñada 2012).
An assessment of this third phase in terms of systemic 
change reveals that breadth as well as depth of change 
remains limited. A few NGOs still remain major providers as 
knowledge input for companies managing the palm oil value 
chain, while the role of farmers’ associations, communities 
and academia in informing and influencing the major busi-
ness players remains limited. The example of how GHG are 
assessed and reported also illustrates that the industry has 
the strongest power of influencing decisions over key stra-
tegic issues. All in all, despite the mechanisms put in place 
to settle disputes between different stakeholders, the RSPO 
and its certification system seem not able to significantly 
shift power structures in and around the palm oil industry.
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Harnessing Wicked Problems in the RSPO: 
An Empirical Illustration
As becomes apparent from this historical overview, prob-
lems surrounding palm oil production involve an entangled 
bundle of issues that change over time and generate con-
flict and uncertainty as multiple stakeholders intervene and 
interact. Although entangled with each other in feedback 
loops—for example, knowledge uncertainty has often ham-
pered stakeholders’ awareness that problems were chang-
ing over time; or stakeholders raising new issues or taking 
different scientific approaches exacerbated value conflict—
these dimensions of wickedness became more evident and 
distinguishable over time. This section illustrates how the 
RSPO responded to the dimensions of wickedness by adapt-
ing its organization over time. Tables 3, 4 and 5 give a con-
cise overview based on the conducted systematic literature 
review.
Table 3  Harnessing dynamic complexity in governance processes: RSPO illustration
Dynamic complexity Key governance processes in the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil
Deliberation Decision-making Enforcement
Key question and summary of 
evidence
How does the MSP identify and 
discuss emerging and re-emerg-
ing issues?
Issues emerged from sources (e.g., 
actors, events) both inside and 
outside the partnership. Issues 
were discussed through formal 
mechanisms, which also changed 
over time. Yet, informal mecha-
nisms often do not facilitate 
issue raising by resource-scarce 
groups
How does the MSP take decisions 
on emerging issues?
Adopted criteria are revised over 
time. New rules and reporting 
criteria incorporate requests of 
stakeholders external to the part-
nership. Decisions are de facto 
postponed on highly contentious 
issues. Limited participation in 
deliberation also limits decision-
making
How does the MSP implement 
and monitor decisions made on 
emerging issues?
Enforcement of decisions on 
emerging issues limited by 
the availability of resources. 
Assessment tools developed only 
at pilot level, thus with limited 
outreach. Limited participation 
in deliberation and decision-
making also limits enforcement 
of decisions
Re-interpretation of the empirical 
literature
● Based on Oxfam Novib’s criti-
cisms for insufficient representa-
tiveness in, the setting of the dis-
cussion on poverty changed over 
time, a smallholder taskforce 
(Oosterveer et al. 2014; Offer-
mans and Glasbergen 2015);
● Based on Greenpeace’s Cooking 
the Climate report (2013), two 
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emis-
sions working groups formed to 
identify ways to achieve GHG 
reductions (2009-2011) after that 
(Bessou et al. 2014)
● Both biodiversity and cultural/
spiritual values attached to a 
specific area were incorporated 
in the High Conservation Value 
principle (Brandi et al. 2015)
● Distance, cost, language and 
culture of RSPO meetings alien-
ate local stakeholders from the 
RSPO meetings culture, thus 
limiting their active participation 
to discussions (Cheyns 2014; 
Johnson 2014; Marin-Burgos 
et al. 2015; Offermans and Glas-
bergen 2015)
● NGOs and downstream firms 
(e.g., manufacturers or retailers) 
proposed and succeeded to 
include GHG emission criteria 
and targets in P&C (Adnan 
2009)
● Due to Oxfam advocacy, RSPO 
was forced to adjust social 
criteria in P&C to better specify 
and link them to international 
practices, and international norm 
of Free, Prior, and Informed 
Consent (2007)
● Through the creation of the a 
smallholder farmer taskforce 
(2005), RSPO created a system 
of group certification for indi-
vidual smallholders to share the 
costs of certification and be cer-
tified under a single certificate
● Smallholders and local com-
munities struggle to bring their 
voice to the decision-making 
table (Cheyns 2014; Johnson 
2014; Marin-Burgos et al. 2015; 
Offermans and Glasbergen 
2015)
● Decisions on issues that are not 
in the agenda of resource-rich 
stakeholders, such as the orangu-
tan issue, are de facto postponed 
(Ruysschaerts and Salles 2014)
● The decisions taken on the 
biodiversity loss (e.g., orangu-
tan issue) are weekly enforced: 
financial compensation for oran-
gutan preservation is too small, 
non-integration within the socio-
politico-legal Indonesian context 
and lacking effective external 
control system (Ruysschaerts 
and Salles 2014)
● The monitoring of GHG emis-
sion computations are limited 
to pilot field tests (Bessou et al. 
2014)
● In Colombia, RSPO field trips 
show only the “brighter side” 
of the palm oil industry, not 
influenced by military and politi-
cal influences within the country 
(Johnson 2014; Marin-Burgos 
et al. 2015)
● Connected to limited participa-
tion in deliberation and decision-
making, smallholders and local 
communities struggle to achieve 
enforcement on the issue that 
they raise (e.g., land conflict and 
poverty) (Cheyns 2014; Johnson 
2014; Marin-Burgos et al. 2015; 
Offermans and Glasbergen 2015)
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Harnessing Wickedness in Deliberation Processes
Since its establishment, which took place as a response to 
an emerging issue, the RSPO has progressively adapted 
its organization to take into consideration new issues over 
time, such as deforestation, smallholders’ poverty and vio-
lation of human rights, biodiversity loss, land conflicts and 
GHG emissions. These issues emerged from sources (e.g., 
actors, events) both inside and outside the partnership. As 
a response, issues were discussed through ad hoc formal 
mechanisms, such as working groups, which also evolved 
over time based on stakeholders’ demands. Yet, more intan-
gible issues around differences in culture, relationships and 
socioeconomic backgrounds have often hampered local 
stakeholders from raising an issue (harnessing dynamic 
complexity through deliberation, Table 3). For example, 
GHG emissions first emerged on the agenda of the RSPO in 
2007 when Greenpeace published its report “Cooking the 
Climate,” but it took two more years and the adoption of 
the European Union’s Renewable Energy Directive in 2009, 
until environmental NGOs and downstream firms, such as 
consumer goods manufacturers and retailers, jointly advo-
cated for the inclusion of GHG criteria and targets in the 
revised P&C of the RSPO.
Reacting to different emerging issues over time, the 
RSPO provided and adapted its structure to take on and 
discuss the related conflicting values among stakeholders. 
While all stakeholders had formal access to the discussion 
in the RSPO, some actors decided to stay absent from the 
discussions or even leave the RSPO as a sign of protest, 
Table 4  Harnessing value conflict in governance processes: RSPO illustration
Value conflict Key governance processes in the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil
Deliberation Decision-Making Enforcement
Key ques-
tion and 
summary of 
evidence
How does the MSP take on and discuss 
different and potentially conflicting 
values underlying the issues at hand?
Formally, all stakeholders to the table for 
discussion. Yet, conflicting views often 
turn into some stakeholder leaving or 
not joining the discussion table
How does the MSP take decisions that 
synthesize and mediate conflicting 
values?
Majority voting does not allow a 
synthesis between conflicting values. 
Controversial decisions sometimes led 
to exacerbation of contentious issues 
within the RSPO. The most controver-
sial issues were sometimes left out of 
the decision-making process
How does the MSP deal with conflicting 
values in the implementation and moni-
toring of decisions?
Monitoring and enforcement of decided 
standards and dispute resolution among 
conflicting stakeholders rarely takes 
place because of resource scarcity and 
even collusion issues
Re-interpre-
tation of the 
empirical 
literature
● Formally, all stakeholders can par-
ticipate to debates online and general 
assembly (Bessou et al. 2014; Marin-
Burgos et al. 2015; Offermans and 
Glasbergen 2015)
● Because of conflicts between final con-
sumers and food manufacturers versus 
large producers on the GHG emissions 
issue, the Indonesian producer associa-
tion left the RSPO (Adnan 2009)
● In Colombia, Acciòn Ecologica 
outspokenly decided not to participate 
to discussions, and RSPO decided 
not to further investigate why Acciòn 
Ecologica decided not to participate or 
incorporate their view into the RSPO 
(Johnson 2014)
● Despite conflicts between Malay-
sian and Indonesian companies and 
smallholders on the linkage between 
palm oil and poverty, smallholders 
do not have direct representation on 
the Executive Board and on the P&C 
working group (Marin-Burgos et al. 
2015; Offermans and Glasbergen 2015)
● Decision-making on smallholders’ 
participation to certification schemes 
focused only on how they could 
“conform to the RSPO standard” rather 
than on the substance of the standard 
itself: this prevented smallholders 
from integrating their own visions of 
sustainability into the standard (Cheyns 
2014). Farmers’ attempts to influence 
the content of the standard have gener-
ally been rejected (Cheyns 2014)
● Vote is based on a majority system 
rather than seeking a synthesis among 
different positions (Offermans and 
Glasbergen 2015)
● In the revision of GHG report-
ing criterion in P&C, value conflict 
among stakeholders mounted on if 
and how GHG emissions needed to be 
considered in both food and biofuel 
industries) (Schouten and Glasbergen 
2012)
● A Dispute Settlement Facility was 
created as a mediation tool to resolve 
disputes between local communities 
and palm oil produces
● An Advisory Group was established to 
help set it up and monitor any arising 
cases
● Enforcement of decisions on standards 
is based on availability of resources 
(e.g., funding, training, etc.) to support 
resource-scarce stakeholders, but these 
are sometimes not available (Oosterveer 
et al. 2014; Brandi et al. 2015)
● Land conflicts seem to only be solved 
if powerful players (e.g., interna-
tional NGOs) help rural communities 
strengthen their bargaining position vis-
à-vis companies (Köhne 2014). Yet, out 
of 600 palm oil related land conflicts in 
Indonesia, only few affected communi-
ties were able to resort to the support of 
external actors (Köhne 2014)
● Companies used the RSPO pre-certifi-
cate assessment as a legitimacy proof in 
land conflicts with communities (Köhne 
2014)
● Report “Who watches the watchman?” 
(EIA 2015) found that auditing firms 
sometimes collude with companies to 
hide standard violations (e.g., labor 
abuses, land conflicts with local com-
munities). There were 52 complaints 
of certification violations in the RSPO 
system (EIA 2015)
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thus pushing the conflict outside the RSPO (harnessing 
value conflict through deliberation, Table 4). Further-
more, the RSPO has overall consulted a heterogeneous, 
yet limited group of stakeholders to better understand 
the debated issues and develop appropriate assessment 
tools. Participation and influence was limited to those 
sources that were considered as technical and objective 
(harnessing knowledge uncertainty through deliberation, 
Table 5). For example, given the knowledge uncertainty 
and value conflicts between the proponent of GHG emis-
sions targets and palm oil producers, the RSPO commis-
sioned a first working group (WG1) in 2008 to review all 
stages of the palm oil supply chain and create support for 
voluntary actions to reduce emissions. As no consensus for 
Table 5  Harnessing knowledge uncertainty in governance processes: RSPO illustration
Knowledge uncertainty Key governance processes in the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil
Deliberation Decision-Making Enforcement
Key question and summary of 
evidence
How does the MSP consult a 
plurality of knowledge sources 
and has meaningful discussions 
under the condition of uncer-
tainty?
Scientific knowledge from a lim-
ited group of stakeholders was 
sought to develop assessment 
tools. Limited participation and 
influence of other sources of 
knowledge that are not consid-
ered as scientific
How does the MSP acknowledge 
knowledge uncertainty and 
integrate a plurality of knowl-
edge perspectives when taking 
decisions?
Despite a consideration to dif-
ferent knowledge sources, only 
knowledge from few interna-
tional NGOs and companies 
has been processed to develop 
assessment tools for stand-
ards. The approach of using 
knowledge is mostly based on 
choosing knowledge rather than 
integrating it
How does the MSP use results from 
a plurality of knowledge sources 
when implementing and monitor-
ing decisions?
Very limited heterogeneity of 
methods and perspectives used 
to monitor and enforce decisions 
on data collection and analysis 
on multiple issues tackled by the 
RSPO. On GHG emissions, data 
collection and analysis is based 
on self-assessment and, so far, on 
a limited sample
Re-interpretation of the empirical 
literature
● Environmental consultancy firm 
ProForest to conduct techni-
cal studies for further insights. 
These studies formed the basis 
for the initial discussions among 
all stakeholders and seem-
ingly addressed the knowledge 
uncertainty about palm oil. 
These ProForest technical stud-
ies helped to narrow down and 
clearly demarcate the problem 
at a very early stage (Nikoloyuk 
et al. 2010)
● Science-based working groups 
on GHG emission issues devel-
oped PalmGHG, a calculator 
using life cycle assessment 
to quantify major sources of 
emissions and sequestration for 
individual palm oil mills and 
their supply base (Bessou et al. 
2014)
● Unilever and WWF able to hold 
key positions during the multi-
stakeholder processes and steer 
the discussions based on prag-
matism and technical rationality 
(Schouten and Glasbergen 2012; 
Ponte & Cheyns 2013), while 
local stakeholders found difficult 
to let their knowledge be heard 
given the structure of RSPO 
events (Cheyns 2014; Johnson 
2014)
● At the stage of choosing and 
processing knowledge for 
informing RSPO decisions, only 
data from companies and NGO 
are processed and interpreted. 
Instead, knowledge from aca-
demia, farmers’ associations and 
local communities has not been 
considered on various issues 
(e.g., smallholder poverty, GHG 
emissions) between 2009 and 
2012 (Bessou et al. 2014; Offer-
mans and Glasbergen 2015)
● On various issues, the RSPO 
took an approach of choosing 
rather than integrating different 
knowledge approaches from 
stakeholders between 2007 and 
2013 (Marin-Burgos et al. 2015; 
Oosterveer et al. 2014; Offer-
mans and Glasbergen 2015)
● While informally RSPO 
stakeholders recognize that no 
knowledge approach guarantees 
certain outcomes on the issues 
tackled in the RSPO, RSPO cri-
teria do not explicitly consider 
uncertainty in the assessment 
tools developed so far (Bes-
sou et al. 2014; Offermans and 
Glasbergen 2015)
● Data collection and analysis on 
GHG emissions is implemented 
exclusively by one stakeholder 
group (companies), which are 
asked to self-assess their per-
formance (Bessou et al. 2014). 
Moreover, pilot tests suffered 
of limited data availability at 
company level in 2012 and 2013 
(Bessou et al. 2014)
● The GHG calculator was devel-
oped from a knowledge approach 
chosen by environmental consul-
tancy firms and energy companies 
(Bessou et al. 2014), so little 
input from other stakeholders was 
used in the assessment
● Land titling was needed to 
receive RSPO certification, but 
this enforcement system was 
contested because it implies 
an acceptance of market-based 
mechanisms for a monetary eval-
uation of land (Johnson 2014). 
Thus, the perspective of stake-
holders providing a sociocultural 
value to the land was ignored at a 
monitoring level (Johnson 2014)
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decision-making could be reached, another working group 
(WG2) was established in 2009, comprising both members 
of the Executive Board as well as 20 non-RSPO members, 
with representation from each of the RSPO’s constituting 
groups. WG2 was tasked with developing a framework for 
verifiable reductions in GHG emissions. To reduce fur-
ther value conflict, processes of deliberation within WG2 
were focused on getting a better scientific understanding of 
the problem and developing technical measurement tools 
(Bessou et al. 2014). This was supposed to lay the founda-
tion for a legitimate decision-making process surrounding 
the revised P&C.
Harnessing Wickedness in Decision‑Making 
Processes
In the face of several issues which have emerged over time, 
the RSPO has been hesitant and slow in changing decision-
making processes accordingly. The P&C have been revised 
over time to incorporate requests of some stakeholders 
within the RSPO. Yet, decisions on highly contentious issues 
(e.g., biodiversity loss) have been postponed over time, and 
limited informal access to RSPO meetings also hampered 
representativeness of stakeholders in decision-making 
on new issues (harnessing dynamic complexity through 
decision-making, Table 3). Furthermore, the majority vot-
ing system in decision-making has often prevented a syn-
thesis between conflicting values. Controversial decisions 
sometimes led to exacerbating contentious issues in the 
RSPO (harnessing value conflict through decision-making, 
Table 4). For example, at a decision-making stage, GHG 
emissions turned into one of the most polarized issues 
among RSPO members with a pronounced split between 
“final consumers” and “large producers” (Ruysschaerts and 
Salles 2014; Moreno-Peñaranda et al. 2015). Particularly 
Indonesian stakeholders were opposed to introducing cri-
teria and targets for GHG emissions (Khor 2011). In 2011, 
GAPKI—the Indonesian Palm Oil Association—even with-
drew from the RSPO, while simultaneously the Indonesian 
Government announced to develop its own standard for cer-
tification (the ISPO). The ISPO was explicitly designed as a 
competitor standard with lower environmental criteria than 
the RSPO (Schouten and Bitzer 2015). Also after GAPKI’s 
exit, value conflicts prevailed and prevented the development 
of stringent rules on GHG emissions or a moratorium on the 
use of peat lands for palm oil production.
Along with this response to value conflicts, the decision-
making process in the RSPO showed only limited integration 
of different knowledge perspectives. Despite considering dif-
ferent knowledge sources, only knowledge from few interna-
tional NGOs and companies has been processed to develop 
assessment tools for standards across different issues. There-
fore, the approach of using knowledge in taking decisions 
has mostly been based on choosing one knowledge perspec-
tive rather than integrating them (harnessing knowledge 
uncertainty through decision-making, Table 5). For example, 
on the issue of reducing GHG emissions, the revised P&C 
in 2013 contained new rules on reducing emissions from 
new plantings (criterion 7.8) and reporting on the reduc-
tions from 2017 onward (voted in by 213 with only six votes 
against the decision). Companies are also required to use 
PalmGHG, a tool to quantify major sources of emissions and 
sequestration for individual palm oil mills and their supply 
base developed by WG2, to demonstrate compliance with 
the P&C. Yet, many NGOs and activists were disappointed 
that these rules do not go far enough on GHG emissions 
(Nesadurai 2013). Palm oil producers, on the other hand, 
perceived the new rules as yet another unfair burden placed 
on their shoulders (Adnan 2013).
Harnessing Wickedness in Enforcement Processes
Problems in enforcement and implementation of jointly 
agreed interventions and standards have raised new issues 
in the RSPO and exacerbated value conflict. First of all, the 
enforcement of decisions on emerging issues was subject 
to stakeholders having the needed resources to make use 
of the decisions taken—which oftentimes turned out to be 
a significant hurdle (Moreno-Peñaranda et al. 2015). For 
example, local communities had limited resources to file 
complaints on the agreed procedures related to land conflict 
issues with palm oil companies, or smallholders found the 
financial compensation for orangutan preservation too small 
for changing their practices on this emerging issue (har-
nessing dynamic complexity through enforcement, Table 3). 
Furthermore, monitoring standard compliance and imple-
menting dispute resolution mechanisms among conflicting 
stakeholders have been hampered by resource scarcity and 
even collusion issues (harnessing value conflict through 
enforcement, Table 4). This has contributed to widespread 
non-compliance with the RSPO standard among members 
(Laurance et al. 2010). Finally, impact assessment tools have 
been developed and used with very limited consideration of 
the variety of knowledge and perspectives brought by dif-
ferent stakeholder issues (harnessing knowledge uncertainty 
through enforcement, Table 5). For example, during the 
preparations for the 2013 revision of the P&C, a pilot study 
was carried out in 2011 with just nine RSPO companies 
to check the applicability of PalmGHG as a management 
tool and its ease of implementation. While this allowed for 
some modifications to the tool before decision-making took 
place, it is also reported that there are still problems with 
regard to site-specific attunement of the tool (Bessou et al. 
2014). Since the adoption of the revised P&C in 2013, the 
Emission Reduction Working Group (ERWG) was tasked 
with reviewing and fine-tuning the tools, emission factors 
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and methodologies during the so-called implementation 
period, until criterion 7.8 entered into force at the begin-
ning of 2017.
Discussion and Conclusion
Contributions to the Literature on Cross‑Sector 
Partnerships and Systemic Change
This conceptual paper brings a governance perspective to the 
debate on how MSPs deal with complex societal challenges 
and support processes of systemic change to adequately 
address them. The study builds on the notion that, given the 
complex nature of the challenges at hand, systemic change 
requires the use of less conventional approaches (Colquitt 
and George 2011; Ferraro et al. 2015) to instigate remarkable 
shifts in power structures (i.e., depth of systemic change), as 
well as supporting change across multiple societal spheres 
and subsectors (i.e., breadth of systemic change) (Waddell 
et al. 2015; Waddock et al. 2015). In this context, harnessing 
complexity is necessary to support systemic change in ways 
that address the nature of the problems (Cohen and Axelrod 
2000). To further understand how MSPs can approach the 
nature of problems, this paper has introduced the notion of 
harnessing wicked problems and investigates whether and 
how MSPs harness wicked problems through a set of inter-
related governance processes. By way of operationalization, 
the paper has proposed an analytical framework entailing a 
set of questions and elements that empirically reflect (i.e., 
operationalize) what harnessing wicked problems means in 
the context of MSPs.
The proposed framework articulates how MSPs harness 
wicked problems along their three key dimensions (i.e., 
dynamic complexity, value conflict and knowledge uncer-
tainty) during the key governance processes (i.e., delibera-
tion, decision-making and enforcement). These three dimen-
sions come to the fore in all governance processes of MSPs, 
which contributes to previous studies on MSP governance 
(e.g., Roloff 2008; Seitanidi and Crane 2009; Schouten and 
Glasbergen 2012). As such, the framework contributes to 
the literature on cross-sector partnerships by explaining 
how forms of collaborative governance adapt to changes, 
conflicts and uncertainty in the external environment. Fur-
thermore, it contributes to the literature on the governance 
of wicked problems, as it provides a parsimonious way of 
assessing and comparing how MSPs harness the problem 
dimensions that they seek to tackle. In advancing such a 
governance perspective to understand how MSPs deal with 
wicked problems over time, this analytical framework adds 
to existing explanations for partnerships’ organizational 
change.
We wish to highlight two key contributions to this schol-
arly debate on the governance of cross-sector partnerships 
and systemic change. First, our paper contributes to prob-
lem-based research on MSPs by assessing changes in the 
organizational form of MSPs through the theoretical lens of 
wicked problems. Despite repeated calls for further insights 
on how MSPs address complex societal problems—specifi-
cally on the impact of MSPs (e.g., van Tulder et al. 2016)—
studies that actually bridge the gap between MSPs and the 
problems they seek to address are scarce. Such a problem-
based perspective is missing even in recent studies, which, 
similarly to our study, recommend for organizations to inter-
nally embrace the complexity in their external environment 
(Schneider et al. 2016). The very basis of problem-based 
approaches dictates that “if one wants to solve a problem, 
one must generally know what the problem is” (Kerlinger 
and Lee 2000, p. 24). Thus, taking a wicked problem per-
spective to the organization of MSPs resonates with the 
idea that these arrangements operate in complex systems 
which follow nonlinear patterns and which must be care-
fully understood before instigating action (Waddock et al. 
2015). Moving wicked problems to the fore when analyzing 
collaborative governance enhances our understanding of 
the linkages between MSPs and field-level impacts toward 
systemic change (Colquitt and George 2011; Ferraro et al. 
2015).
Second, we argue that the framework developed in this 
paper helps providing a partial explanation to changes in 
the organization of partnerships seeking to address soci-
etal problems (Selsky and Parker 2010), by linking such 
changes to attempts of harnessing different problem dimen-
sions. For example, the RSPO engaged in new discussions, 
reconfigured its knowledge sources or involved new actors 
as a response to new issues that emerged over time (e.g., 
poverty, GHG emissions or biodiversity loss). Furthermore, 
the framework helps to explain why partnerships may be 
criticized by stakeholders outside their boundaries, and why 
they may terminate, lose momentum or experience their 
members leaving and/or joining competing institutions when 
they do not harness some dimensions of the problems (Hahn 
and Pinkse 2014; Schouten and Bitzer 2015). For example, 
given the struggles that the RSPO faced in harnessing value 
conflict and knowledge uncertainty, especially in its deci-
sion-making and enforcing processes, Indonesian palm oil 
producers and other local stakeholders left the RSPO and 
founded a rival certification scheme.
Having said this, the example of the RSPO shows that 
it is very challenging to identify any causal relationship 
between organizational changes in MSPs and the breadth or 
depth systemic (Waddell et al. 2015). Our analysis indicates 
a limited ability of the RSPO to trigger systemic change, at 
least not in the way that we interpret the concept. The idea 
of an MSP, such as the RSPO, is to use the power of market 
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actors to create systemic change. At the same time, this is 
also constraining, as power structures do not change, thus 
limiting the depth of systemic change a priori. Furthermore, 
systemic change takes time and is unlikely to occur quickly 
as a result of top-down interventions. There might be non-
linear effects with time delays, indicating that specific trig-
gers may only take effect and manifest in systemic change 
after a considerable period of time. This makes systemic 
change, both as a process and an outcome, difficult, if not 
impossible, to assess. Both empirically and conceptually, 
systemic change remains an elusive term worth to be further 
investigated for promoting a discussion about the direction 
and nature of change promoted in MSPs in relation to the 
nature of wicked problems.
Alternative Explanations of Organizational Change 
in Cross‑Sector Partnerships
Rather than attributing changes in the organization of MSPs 
solely to the nature of wicked problems, we concur with 
Selsky and Parker (2010) who suggest alternative explana-
tions on the basis of a combination of stakeholder influence 
and societal interest. As such, MSPs may implement changes 
to their organization more or less rapidly depending on the 
salience of the stakeholders (Mitchell et al. 1997; Bowen 
et al. 2010) who raise an issue, participate in a conflict, or 
propose a knowledge approach. According to Mitchell et al. 
(1997), stakeholders are salient to an organization (such as 
an MSP) when they have power to influence it, when their 
requests are perceived as legitimate and when their claims 
entail a sense of urgency. In the RSPO, for example, the part-
nership started adapting its governance form once stakehold-
ers which were perceived as powerful and legitimate, such 
as European customers and Oxfam Novib, increased their 
pressure on the palm oil industry with regard to GHG emis-
sions and smallholder poverty issues. By contrast, demands 
from Indonesian producers—who may have been considered 
as less powerful and legitimate—to distribute the costs of 
certification along the value chain did not lead to signifi-
cant organizational changes. Research on other MSPs in the 
agro-food sector has similarly shown the important role of 
stakeholder salience in promoting organizational changes of 
MSPs (Dentoni and Peterson 2011).
A second alternative explanation of why MSPs engage in 
organizational change may relate to their attempt to create 
and maintain legitimacy in national or international con-
texts of insufficient public regulation (e.g., Schouten and 
Glasbergen 2011). Mena and Palazzo (2012), for instance, 
suggested that MSPs emerge and develop their organization 
depending on the institutional framework surrounding the 
problem, rather than based on the nature of the problem. 
When problems transcend national boundaries, the limi-
tations of government regulation create a legitimacy void 
(Scherer and Palazzo 2011) which may require private actors 
to develop new strategies to cope with multiple and con-
tradictory stakeholders’ pressures (Pache and Santos 2010; 
Scherer et al. 2013). This view is also reflected in the RSPO, 
as the partnership receives pressures to adapt their enforce-
ment mechanisms (e.g., effective monitoring on certification, 
support to resource-scarce stakeholders in the dispute set-
tlement) due to the voids left by public regulation in palm 
oil producing countries. Along with transcending national 
boundaries, problems are also to some extent embedded in 
pre-existing relationships and mechanisms which can also 
shape MSP governance processes (Levy and Newell 2002). 
For example, in the RSPO case, the rules of international 
trade set by the World Trade Organization (WTO) formally 
constrain enforcement processes.
To integrate these different streams of knowledge on how 
MSPs change or evolve in addressing complex problems, 
future studies may explore if and how the process of har-
nessing wicked problems relate to stakeholder salience and 
international and national regimes. In particular, do stake-
holder salience and changes in national or international 
regimes influence how MSPs harness wicked problems? 
Institutional theory indeed suggests that actors deal with 
complexity in partnerships differently depending on their 
position relative to stakeholders (Scherer et al. 2013) and 
the role of public regulation (Scherer and Palazzo 2011). 
Yet, no study has specifically focused on how stakeholder 
salience and the institutional framework influence a MSP 
approach in dealing with knowledge uncertainty, value con-
flict and dynamic complexity. Vice versa, does the process 
of harnessing wicked problems in MSPs influence stake-
holder salience and the broader national or international 
regimes? For example, can deliberation, decision-making 
and enforcement processes in MSPs significantly shift power 
balances, or change perceptions of urgency and legitimacy 
of a stakeholder requests? Can these processes in MSPs 
even contribute to influencing overarching institutional and 
policy frameworks? While this role of partnerships would 
have remarkable implications for determining the depth 
and breadth of systemic change (Waddell et al. 2015; Wad-
dock et al. 2015), there is still limited empirical evidence 
to address these questions. To further investigate those, the 
case of the RSPO can provide a fertile ground for observa-
tion and analysis in the years to come.
Implications for Practitioners 
in Multi‑stakeholder Partnerships
What guidance can our framework of harnessing wicked 
problems during the key governance processes of MSPs 
offer to practitioners? While our framework was initially 
developed to guide the operationalization of harnessing 
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wicked problems (for empirical purposes), it can also be 
further expanded into a more prescriptive framework, espe-
cially when revisiting the three dimensions of wicked prob-
lems. This does not result in a list of universally applicable 
action points, but requires a context- and stakeholder-spe-
cific approach.
Taking this into account, first, our framework provides 
indications of how to operate under conditions of knowl-
edge uncertainty in which not only causes and effects of the 
problem itself are unclear, but also the consequences of MSP 
action are difficult to predict. This entails that MSPs should:
• Take into account different types of knowledge sources in 
processes of deliberation, decision-making and enforce-
ment;
• Adapt decisions and ways of enforcement in response to 
newly emerging knowledge; and
• Carefully monitor implementation and evaluate impacts 
of the decisions taken involving, to any possible extent, 
a multiplicity of knowledge sources.
 Second, the framework highlights the importance of 
addressing and mitigating value conflicts among stakehold-
ers on the issues at hand. When opposing stakeholders define 
the problem to the exclusion of other definitions, a lack of 
harnessing value conflicts and a resulting lack of synthesis 
can lead to fragmentation and reduced incentives for col-
laboration. Therefore, MSPs should:
• Facilitate authentic processes of deliberation among rel-
evant stakeholders with possibly conflicting values with 
the objective of inclusion and synthesis;
• Put mechanisms for dispute settlement in place (regard-
ing deliberation, decision-making and enforcement); and
• Acknowledge new value conflicts that might arise from 
decisions that are taken and ways of enforcing those deci-
sions.
 Third, harnessing wickedness indicates that MSPs should 
be prepared to continuously take into account newly emerg-
ing and re-emerging issues—and realize that what worked 
before for some issues of the wicked problem will not neces-
sarily work for other issues. This implies that MSPs should:
• Continuously (re-)assess emerging and re-emerging 
issues raised inside and outside of the MSP;
• Continuously (re-)assess the spectrum of relevant stake-
holders to include in deliberation processes, decision-
making processes and processes regarding enforcement; 
and
• Flexibly amend the existing governance processes and 
structures based on the nature of (re-)emerging issues.
 While the literature suggests that understanding and 
adapting to the nature of problems may support deeper and 
broader systemic change (Waddock et al. 2015), the nature 
itself of wicked problems suggests prudence in reaching 
universal prescriptions on how to tackle them. Instead, 
the choice of MSPs to harness problems involves a num-
ber of trade-offs and dilemmas in itself. On the one hand, 
process of harnessing wicked problems may help MSPs to 
anticipate the unintended consequences of their decisions 
and interventions. This view resonates with the established 
idea that not only collaborative partnerships, but all organ-
izations need to develop structures to deal with environ-
mental complexity (Tushman and Nadler 1978; Schneider 
et al. 2016). On the other hand, harnessing wicked prob-
lems may seem like a never-ending process, perhaps even 
a vicious cycle, in which raising new issues leads to the 
discovery of even more new issues and so forth. There-
fore, the incentives for stakeholders to embark on these 
governance processes may not be apparent at first sight. 
However, this paper illustrates that it may be an inevita-
ble process for MSPs aiming to address complex soci-
etal problems. Under this lens, the evolution of the RSPO 
clearly shows that denying wickedness does not succeed 
over time. Moreover, the different dimensions of “harness-
ing” facilitate a process toward a deeper understanding 
of the problem, which is an indispensable prerequisite 
for meaningful action toward these problems. Harness-
ing wicked problems is undeniably a challenging task and 
requires reflexivity (of own ways of harnessing), flexibility 
(to adapt current ways of harnessing) and responsiveness 
to (re-)emerging issues and conflicting values under condi-
tions of uncertainty.
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Appendix: A brief overview of the wicked 
problem of palm oil production
Sustainability issues 
related to palm oil 
production
Explanation References
Biodiversity loss Conversion of either 
primary or second-
ary forests to oil 
palm results in 
significant biodi-
versity loss
Koh and Wilcove 
(2008)
Deforestation and 
peat land conver-
sion
Analysis of land-
cover data suggests 
that during the 
period 1990–2005, 
55–59% of oil 
palm expansion in 
Malaysia, and at 
least 56% of that in 
Indonesia occurred 
at the expense of 
forests. Oil palm 
expansion has also 
resulted in the 
conversion of peat 
lands leading to 
increased carbon 
dioxide emissions, 
annual fires, as 
well as increased 
subsidence and 
flood risk
FAO (2007), Afriyanti 
et al. (2016)
GHG emissions and 
bioenergy
Land use change is 
the most prominent 
factor in overall 
GHG emissions 
from palm oil 
production. Palm 
oil energy chains 
based on land that 
was previously 
natural rainforest or 
peat land have such 
large emissions that 
they cannot meet 
emission reduction 
targets
Wicke et al. (2008)
Sustainability issues 
related to palm oil 
production
Explanation References
Haze Haze—a weather 
phenomenon that 
leads to an atmos-
pheric visibility of 
less than 10 km due 
to suspended solid 
or liquid particles, 
smoke and vapor in 
the atmosphere—in 
Southeast Asia is 
commonly caused 
by the burning of 
forest and peat 
soils to make way 
for agricultural 
development, 
predominantly 
associated with oil 
palm cultivation. 
In early 2014, the 
haze was intensi-
fied by an unusu-
ally long dry spell 
of weather. Major 
societal disruption 
resulted, including 
closure of schools, 
in an increase in 
haze-related health 
issues, disruption 
of airline sched-
ules, etc.
Padfield et al. (2016)
Labor rights viola-
tions
A nine-month 
investigation of the 
industry revealed 
widespread abuses 
of basic human 
rights. Among 
an estimated 3.7 
million workers 
in the industry 
are thousands of 
child laborers and 
workers who face 
dangerous and abu-
sive conditions
Skinner (2013)
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Sustainability issues 
related to palm oil 
production
Explanation References
Land conflicts Disagreements and 
uncertainty over 
land tenure are 
widespread and 
can be violent. 
Conflicts between 
communities and 
companies have 
resulted almost 
entirely from lack 
of transparency, 
the absence of 
Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent 
and unequal benefit 
sharing and have 
been exacerbated 
by the absence of 
clear land rights
Vermeulen and Goad 
(2006), Rist et al. 
(2010)
Livelihoods of small-
holder farmers
Around three million 
smallholder farm-
ers are producing 
palm oil. Narratives 
of inclusion/exclu-
sion might propose 
that the solution to 
rural poverty lies in 
incorporation into 
the oil palm econ-
omy. Yet McCarthy 
(2010) suggested 
that individuals 
who find them-
selves incorporated 
into oil palm 
under unfavorable 
conditions will not 
only remain poor 
but may even face 
deeper poverty. 
The likelihood of 
inclusion/exclusion 
or adverse incor-
poration depends 
on the terms under 
which smallholders 
engage with the oil 
palm industry
Potts et al. (2014), 
McCarthy (2010)
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